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In 1900, a black student wishing to pursue a career in
medicine could choose from 10 schools in a variety
of locations and settings (Table 1). By 1920, a black
student had only three choices and little assurance that
any one of these schools would survive until graduation
day four years hence. What had happened? The Flexner
Report, containing devastating comments about all but
two of the black schools and demeaning statements
about black physicians, appeared in 1910, directly
affecting the fate of these schools. By 1923, only the
two institutions he said deserved to exist, Meharry Med-
ical College and Howard University Medical Depart-
ment, remained. Those two schools, too, almost closed
their doors as organized medicine and medical philan-
thropies pushed the educational reforms promoted by
Flexner beyond the capacities ofthe black institutions to
change. Between 1905 and 1920, black medical educa-
tion passed through two crisis periods: 1905-1912 and
1917-1918. Flexner was involved in both.
The Condition of Black Medical
Schools in the Early 20th Century
Contemporaries classified black medical schools
according to their origins as either missionary or propri-
etary. Though some institutions in the north accepted a
few blacks as medical students, no state, north or south,
operated a medical school for African Americans. In
addition to establishing many colleges to educate freed-
men after the Civil War, northern religious groups
founded a small number of medical schools. For exam-
ple, the Freedmen's Aid Society of the Methodist Epis-
copal Church oversaw the development of Meharry
Medical College and Flint Medical School, and the
American Baptist Home Mission Society allowed Shaw
University to operate Leonard Medical School. Howard
University and its medical department had Congres-
sional backing but also received financial support from
individual, nonsectarian donors. The proprietary
schools, founded in every case by black physicians, had
little if any outside funding.
The precarious nature of these schools' financial
arrangements, whether overseen by white missionary
groups or by enterprising independent black physician
proprietors, put all the African-American medical col-
leges in a vulnerable position from the start. Most of the
schools collapsed with the increased pressure for reform
in the first decades of the 20th century. Meharry,
Howard, Leonard, Flint, Knoxville and Louisville
National were still struggling to survive and improve
when American medicine "discovered" bacteriology,
laboratories, public health and the German education
system. With the revitalization of the American Medical
Association (AMA) and the Association ofAmerican
Medical Colleges (AAMC) at the turn of the century
and these organizations' relentless application of pres-
sure to improve medical education based on the new
ideas in science and education, African-American med-
ical schools found themselves caught in a paradoxical
situation. On the one hand, they saw the demand for
their product-the MD degree-growing to the point at
which some of them could not accommodate all appli-
cants. In 1907, for example, President Charles F.
Meserve of Leonard Medical School told Wallace But-
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trick of the General Education Board (GEB), a Rocke-
feller family philanthropy, that his school had more
applicants than places in each class and more requests
from towns for black physicians than graduates each
year.' On the other hand, every black medical school
faced mounting financial pressures as the demand for
better-trained professors, a longer school year, well-
equipped laboratories and clinical facilities drained lim-
ited resources.
The proprietary schools had no sources of income
other than student fees and perhaps a small investor or
two. Theoretically, the missionary schools could raise
funds from other parts of their universities, their home
mission societies or religious sect donors in the north. In
actuality, black colleges raised little excess funding to
shunt into medical education, and northern mission
societies and individual donors were at this time shifting
priorities to such newer, more immediate problems as
helping the large numbers of eastern and southern Euro-
pean immigrants who were moving into their cities.
Moreover, black students generally came from poor
families that could barely pay even the low tuition, fees
and living expenses of medical college, so the schools
could expect little extra cash from that source. Few
black physicians had succeeded well enough by the ear-
ly 20th century to support their alma maters, nor were
black philanthropists able to do SO.2 State universities
offered little for black students desiring a medical edu-
cation. The rising demand for black physicians and lim-
ited fundraising opportunities caused problems for
black medical schools at a time when they wished to
encourage growth and modernization.
Pressures for Change before Flexner
As historians have shown, Abraham Flexner did not
inaugurate American medical education reform with his
1910 report;3 he stepped into the middle of such an era,
put his imprint on it and, through his work with the GEB
after 1912, influenced the way reforms were implement-
ed. When Flexner began working for The Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching in 1908,
the AMA's Council on Medical Education (CME) had
already evaluated the nation's medical schools three
times, twice using state medical licensing board results
and once through personal visits. Arthur Dean Bevan,
MD (chair) and N.P. Colwell, MD (secretary) had pub-
lished in the Journal ofthe American Medical Associa-
tion (JAMA) the failure rates of individual schools on
state licensure board examinations and even a listing of
acceptable medical colleges based on a classification
scheme they implemented.4 Though they did not publi-
cize the reports stemming from their site visits, Bevan
and Colwell sent these reports to the schools and to the
state medical examining boards, hoping to spur
improvements at the poorer-rated institutions. The
African-American schools fared badly in these evalua-
tions. Their board failure rates in 1904 and 1905 all
greatly exceeded 200/o-the worst category'-and when
the two years' scores were combined, each of the six
schools with sufficient available data appeared in the
Table 1. Black medical colleges, 1868-1923
Year Year
Name City Opened Discontinued Affiliation
Howard University Medical Dept. Washington, DC 1868 - None
Lincoln University Medical Dept. Oxford, PA 1870 1874 Presbyterian
(local)
Straight University Medical Dept. New Orleans 1873 1874 American
Missionary
Assn.
Meharry Medical College Nashville 1876 - Methodist
Episcopal
Leonard Medical School of Shaw Univ. Raleigh 1882 1918 Baptist
Louisville National Medical College Louisville 1888 1912 Independent
Flint Medical College of New Orleans Univ. New Orleans 1889 1911 Methodist
Episcopal
Hannibal Med. College Memphis 1889 1896 Independent
Knoxville College Medical Dept. Knoxville 1895 1900 Presbyterian
Chattanooga National Medical College Chattanooga 1899 1904 Independent
State University Medical Dept. Louisville 1899 1903 Merged Colored Baptist
with LNMC (Kentucky)
Knoxville Medical College Knoxville 1900 1910 Independent
University of West Tennessee
College of Medicine and Surgery Jackson 1900 1907 Independent
Memphis 1907 1923
Medico-Chirurgical and Theological
College of Christ's Institution Baltimore 1900 1908? Independent
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bottom 30% of the 135 studied.6
After its establishment in 1904, well before Flexner's
arrival, the CME promoted both higher entrance
requirements and higher educational standards, making
its appeals both to schools and to state regulatory
boards.7 Most black schools responded by lengthening
their terms, improving hospital and laboratory facilities,
and, at least in written documents, toughening entrance
and graduation requirements.8
The CME had also noted, before Flexner, the cost to
medical schools of needed changes and the necessity of
obtaining outside funding for these reforms. A JAMA
editorial in May 1907 announced that modern medical
education now required two or three times the amount
received in fees from each medical student. Proprietary
schools, the editorial continued, simply did not possess
the ability to raise and pay out such amounts; a large
endowment from private sources or state support was
needed to sustain a school. Medical education was
changing for the better, it concluded, but too many
schools lagged behind, unable to keep up with the rising
standards.9 At annual conferences on medical education,
the CME began doing more than simply publicizing
poor board scores and urging schools to improve; it pro-
posed guidelines for an acceptable education program
and wrote a model state medical practice act.'0
So the CME's efforts before Flexner, though not direct-
ed specifically at black medical schools, in effect put them
on notice. Administrators at African-American institutions
understood the message and realized that the expense of
change as well as the changes themselves threatened each
school's existence. In June 1906, the CME sent a letter to
every American medical school, urging adoption of its pro-
posal that all students take at least one year of college-level
work in biology, chemistry, physics and a foreign language
before admission." Acceptance of this plan would have
immediately reduced the number of students at black med-
ical schools, because few young African Americans went
to college before starting their professional education. Fur-
thermore, only a few African-American colleges offered
such advanced courses, and only a handful of white col-
leges admitted black students. Reduced enrollments at
black medical schools would have meant reduced income,
a situation these schools had to avoid, for both missionary
and proprietary schools relied on student fees as the major
source of funds. Not surprisingly, then, none of the
African-American medical colleges responded positively
to the AMA's request, though each year the number of
white schools implementing the plan grew, as did the pres-
sure for black schools to follow suit.'2
The CME presented other reform ideas during these
pre-Flexner years that threatened the black schools in
particular. Bevan, for instance, must have upset authori-
ties at black schools with his comments about instruc-
tors, made at the April 1907 annual CME conference in
Chicago. He alluded to some medical schools conduct-
ed by people respected in the profession, but imparting
information and teaching the techniques ofa former era.
These institutions offered students little practical expe-
rience in the laboratory, the hospital ward or the clinic,
instead lecturing and quizzing them in the classroom.'3
Though catalogs ofAfrican-American medical schools
claimed to train modem physicians using modem tech-
niques, other available information belies those state-
ments. Leonard's faculty at this time, for instance, dif-
fered little from the faculty 25 years earlier, shortly after
its opening. These local white practitioners, some highly
respected in Raleigh, NC and around the state, had
trained early in the modern medical period. Some had
not kept up with the new scientific ideas and education-
al innovations. With a tiny hospital open only during the
school year and few laboratory facilities, Leonard could
not really offer the best medical education to its stu-
dents.'4 At Flint and Meharry, both supported in part by
the Freedmen's Aid Society, many members of the pre-
dominantly black faculty were either recent medical
graduates (usually of Meharry) with little practical
experience or graduates of many years ago who,
because of race restrictions, had not attended postgradu-
ate courses. Faculty at the black proprietary schools
consisted primarily of their own graduates, some just a
year or two out of school.'5
Bevan also attacked "medical schools conducted
solely for profit" in his April 1907 address, calling them
"a menace" and advocating their nonrecognition.
Though the black proprietary schools had their failings,
they seem not to have existed "solely for profit" and did
turn out needed black practitioners. But the CME
pressed hard to eliminate all proprietary schools and
thereby put pressure on those run by and for blacks in
this pre-Flexner period.'6
Finally, Bevan spoke quite critically of schools offer-
ing courses after four o'clock in the afternoon, when
students with full-time jobs were no doubt tired from a
day's work and had insufficient time to fit in full-length
courses with laboratory and ward work. The AMA
House of Delegates instructed the CME just two months
after Bevan's address not to rate higher than class C any
medical college that offered evening courses.'7 Howard
University Medical Department was then still offering
night courses in Washington, DC, where a strong
demand for such a program existed.
So a year before Flexner even began his medical
school survey, officials, faculty-and perhaps even stu-
dents at African-American medical schools-felt pres-
sure to change their institution's educational program.
They could relate to their own colleges what Leonard
president Meserve said of his: "A crisis has come in the
life of Leonard Medical School." The school, he felt,
had no future ifhe could not find sufficient financial aid
to upgrade it to meet the new educational demands.'8
By December 1908, when Flexner began his study of
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medical education in the United States, three of the
weakest (both financially and academically) black
schools had closed their doors: the Medico-Chirurgical
and Theological College of Christ's Institution in Balti-
more, MD; State University Medical Department in
Louisville, KY (merged with Louisville National Med-
ical College); and Chattanooga (TN) National Medical
College. Little is known about the first school; it appar-
ently had no strong academic or financial basis and few
graduates. The actual date of its closing is not clear,
though it is not mentioned in AMA or AAMC records
after 1908.19 State University, despite its name, had no
affiliation with the Commonwealth of Kentucky, but
received its support from the state's black Baptist organ-
izations. The university continued to train undergradu-
ates and ministers after joining with Louisville National
Medical College in 1903, eventually becoming Sim-
mons College.20 Chattanooga National Medical College,
named by its founder after his alma mater, Louisville
National Medical College, graduated perhaps 16 stu-
dents before closing during its sixth year, in 1904.
Based on the small amount of evidence available, Chat-
tanooga National Medical College's academic program,
facilities, equipment and teaching staff appear inade-
quate.2' Three of the seven remaining black schools-
the University of West Tennessee and Knoxville Med-
ical College (both proprietary) and Leonard Medical
School (Baptist)-received ratings of less than 50%
from the CME in June 1908.22 The CME also recom-
mended that state examining boards withdraw recogni-
tion from these institutions.23
Flexner's Evaluation of Black
Medical Education
African Americans seeking a medical education
already faced challenges when Flexner completed and
published his report in 1910.24 The report: 1) announced
the existence of black medical schools that turned out
practicing black physicians, 2) described the good and
bad points of these schools and advocated improve-
ments or closings just as with the white schools, 3)
reflected an outlook about black medical education that
theAMA readily accepted and applied in its formulation
of education policy, and 4) revealed negative white atti-
tudes toward black physicians during an era of increas-
ing racial tension.
Until the Flexner Report, organized medicine had
said little directly to or about the black medical schools.
Though the CME, almost from its establishment in
1904, had issued annual reports, articles and commen-
taries on medical education in JAMA, never in the 15
years of major medical education reform did JAMA ever
openly discuss the issue of medical education for
blacks. Women's medical education received a passing
reference in each annual education issue and an occa-
sional article. Black schools received no notice other
than the word "colored" posted next to their names in
tables, and one-sentence statements when one of them
received a gift, completed a building or closed. Even
state medical journals of the period rarely acknowl-
edged the presence ofAfrican-American schools within
their state's borders.25 The Flexner Report, describing
each of the seven existing black institutions and spend-
ing fewer than two pages on black medical education
problems, at least documented the almost invisible pres-
ence ofAfrican-American medical schools.
But the Flexner Report also harmed the black cause
by portraying African-American medical education as
deficient in general, and five of the seven black medical
schools as particularly wanting. It said little good about
the three proprietary schools-West Tennessee,
Louisville National and Knoxville-or two of the mis-
sionary schools affiliated with universities-Flint and
Leonard. It did praise the "small and scrupulously clean
hospital of eight beds" at Louisville National.26 But it
also noted the "meager equipment for chemistry, phar-
macy and microscopy" and the "bare ... rooms" at West
Tennessee,27 the absence of laboratory or clinical facili-
ties at Knoxville28 and the paucity of laboratory materi-
als at Leonard29 and Flint.30 Flexner's criticisms were
harsh ("The catalogue of this school [Knoxville] is a tis-
sue of misrepresentations from cover to cover"),3' frank
("Of the three negro schools in the state [Tennessee],
two are without merit"),32 chiding ("The school
[Knoxville] occupies a floor above an undertaker's
establishment"),33 sarcastic ("It was stated by a student
that twice between October 1 and January 28 'a few stu-
dents were taken to the Knoxville College Hospital"'),34
and biting ("Laboratory facilities [at Leonard] ... com-
prise ... a slight chemical laboratory, and a still slighter
equipment for pathology").35 Sometimes, he allowed the
mere statement of facts without comment to convey his
message: "The school [Flint] controls a hospital of 20
beds, with an average of 17 patients monthly and a dis-
pensary with an average daily attendance of one or
two";36 "There is a dispensary [at West Tennessee], with-
out records, in the school building."37 Flexner's reports
on these five schools told readers that black students,
and by implication, current black practitioners who had
graduated from these schools, did not receive an ade-
quate medical education. He even stated at one point,
"Of the seven medical schools for negroes in the United
States, five are at this moment in no position to make
any contribution of value to the solution of the [Negro
health] problem above pointed out. They are wasting
small sums annually and sending out undisciplined
men, whose lack of real training is covered up by the
imposing MD degree."38
The report did more than describe poor conditions at
black medical schools; it prescribed a limited role for
black physicians in their practices and hinted that black
physicians possessed less potential and ability than their
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white counterparts. The tone of Chapter 14, "The Med-
ical Education of the Negro,"39 illustrated well how, in
the world of medicine as in so many other aspects of
American life at the time, whites attempted to discount,
dominate and disvalue blacks. It began with a provoca-
tive statement: "The medical care of the negro race will
never be wholly left to negro physicians." His second
sentence explained this assertion by claiming that
whites had to teach the black physician "to feel a sharp
responsibility for the physical integrity of his people."
Black doctors, according to Flexner, lacked responsibil-
ity enough to take over full care of their own people, but
white doctors possessed that sense. Furthermore, "The
practice of the negro doctor will be limited to his own
race." Flexner's reasoning for such comments became
clearer as he next explained how educating black physi-
cians would also serve white interests in preventing the
spread of diseases from blacks to whites. He was clearly
writing for a white audience when he concluded, "The
negro must be educated not only for his sake, but for
ours." To protect the nation's overall health, the respon-
sibility of "educating the [black] race to know and to
practice fundamental hygienic principles" fell naturally
to the black doctor. Thus, "a well-taught negro sanitari-
an will be immensely useful." So Flexner not only limit-
ed the role ofAfrican-American physicians to caring for
other African Americans but further restricted it to mat-
ters ofpublic health.
Where did black medical schools fit in Flexner's
scheme? They had two missions: 1) to offer "the more
promising of the race ... a substantial education in
which hygiene rather than surgery ... is strongly accen-
tuated;" 2) to "imbue these men with the missionary
spirit so that they will look upon the diploma as a com-
mission to serve their people humbly and devotedly,
away from large cities [in] the village and [on] the plan-
tation, upon which light has hardly as yet begun to
break." If Flexner spelled out in more detail how to
implement a program to accomplish these goals for
black medical education, so different in many ways
from the more research- and practice-oriented program
for whites described in the rest of his report, he must
have done so orally. None of his extant letters to the
black medical schools or his published writing dis-
cussed these matters.
The two medical schools that Flexner believed to be
suited for training black physicians were Meharry and
Howard. He admired Meharry founder GeorgeW Hub-
bard, MD's skill at marshalling slender resources and
building his school into a credible institution with good
laboratory facilities and a small but well-managed
endowment. Meharry lacked only a larger hospital and
dispensary. Howard, with its ties to the federal govern-
ment through a small annual appropriation and the use
of Freedmen's Hospital, had its future "assured." Both
schools, Flexner knew, needed "developing," and both
were "unequal to the need and the opportunity" as they
then existed. He urged religious and philanthropic
organizations as well as individuals to concentrate their
efforts on these two institutions and not to waste sepa-
rate small amounts ofmoney on the other five schools.40
Flexner's recommendation on medical education for
African Americans in 1910 was to close the five "inef-
fectual" schools and encourage their supporters to
donate time and money toward building Howard's and
Meharry's programs.
The Influence of the Flexner Report
In the end, Flexner's black medical school plan pre-
vailed. Only Howard and Meharry survived the reform
era, though both continued to train a full range of med-
ical practitioners rather than "sanitarians" for rural
African Americans. Of the five other institutions, three
closed within two years of the report, one fought on
doggedly for another eight years, and one proprietary
school defiantly remained open until 1923, though its
graduates were unrecognized by most state licensing
boards. Knoxville Medical College, criticized severely
by Flexner, closed the same year the report was pub-
lished. The following year, Flint Medical College, spon-
sored by the same Freedmen's Aid Society of the
Methodist Episcopal Church that was supporting
Meharry, shut down after 20 years. Flint's president
explained that the CME's increasingly intense campaign
for improved standards and the school's lack of money
to make the necessary changes forced its closing.4'
Louisville National Medical College lost its accredita-
tion from the Kentucky State Board of Health and
closed in 1912.42 The influence of the Flexner Report
can be seen in the demise of each ofthese schools.
Few if any African Americans responded directly to
the report in writing, though physicians and educators
must have discussed it. The Committee on Medical Edu-
cation of the National Medical Association (NMA)-
black counterpart to the AMA-had considered the
problems of black medical schools in 1908 and 1909
after the publication of state board scores in JAMA but
remained silent (at least in writing) on the Flexner
Report and medical education in general after 1910.
This committee had no power to implement education
policy at black medical schools. It simply advised NMA
officers and members of medical education matters and
made recommendations for improvements. The com-
mittee had recognized the weaknesses of the several
black colleges even before Flexner and wished to avoid
public embarrassment over them. That, unfortunately,
was no longer possible.43
In 1912, the end of this first crisis period, only four
black schools remained. One of these, the University of
West Tennessee, was isolated from the others until it
closed in 1923, its president taking an independent
course."4 Howard and Meharry, the two schools of which
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Flexner spoke positively, seemed to have bright futures,
leaving only Leonard to prove itself worthy and secure a
firmer position.
The Flexner Report did not conclude an era of med-
ical reform; it appeared in the midst of one. Medical
education standards continued to change, to improve,
pushed along by the schools themselves, the AMA, the
AAMC, state licensing boards, and two major funding
agencies-The Carnegie Foundation for the Advance-
ment of Teaching and the GEB. The remaining African-
American schools still faced difficult times. Howard
and Meharry had received A ratings from the AMA in
the second round of visits (the Flexner visits of 1909 to
1910), though in a special category called "Medical
Schools for the Colored Race."45 They had to keep up
with the latest innovations to retain their positions.
Leonard, rated C, had to catch up.
The Flexner Report brought attention to seven black
medical schools: their presence, their needs, their short-
comings and their potential. Three could not change suf-
ficiently and closed. The remaining schools had to
prove themselves. But no one in the white medical
establishment, not even Flexner, who wanted Howard
and Meharry to endure, helped the schools through this
next crisis period until one more had closed and the oth-
er two were about to follow suit.
The Search for Funding
On February 21, 1910, Howard University President
Wilbur Thirkield acknowledged receipt of an advance
copy ofFlexner's assessment ofhis medical school: "We
are deeply gratified by this favorable representation of
the equipment and work of the school." He told Henry
S. Pritchett, PhD, president ofThe Carnegie Foundation,
that Howard would immediately require of all its fresh-
men applicants one year of college-level science.46
Three months later, Edward Balloch, medical dean, sub-
mitted his annual report to Thirkield, telling him of the
faculty's acceptance of the new admissions require-
ments but concern at the anticipated decline in enroll-
ment and loss of revenue from student tuition. Because
Howard relied on fees for most of its income, plus a
small allowance from the federal government, Balloch
knew that trouble lay ahead. Only by the extraordinary
efforts of the school's secretary-treasurer, the underpay-
ment of faculty salaries and strict economy of educa-
tional expenditures did the medical department break
even each year. Student fees just covered costs. But,
Balloch continued, it was not fair to pay the faculty so
little or to provide them with so few supplies and so lit-
tle equipment. The medical department needed at least
$10,000 over tuition and fees the following year to pay
for the cost of education. What Howard really needed
was a half-million-dollar endowment. Securing one
"should be given precedence over everything else."47
Within months, Thirkield wrote a letter to Andrew
Carnegie, reminding him of his expression of interest in
Howard University Medical Department at the recent
Carnegie Library dedication on campus.48 Undeterred
by Carnegie's quick response that Howard was worthy,
but that he had given them $50,000 for the library the
previous year and the government already provided
annual financial support,49 Thirkield held further discus-
sions with Carnegie's personal secretary. In May 191 1,
he submitted an ambitious proposal for $200,000 to
erect and equip a new building for the medical school.
This time, he enclosed references from Dr. William
Henry Welch of Johns Hopkins, Pritchett of The
Carnegie Foundation, President William Howard Taft,
and Dr. Woodward (PhD) of the Carnegie Institution,
attesting to the value and importance of this investment.
He included a fact sheet illustrating the school's need
for buildings, salaries for full-time professors and other
budget items. Then, as President Meserve of Leonard
Medical School had stated just a few years earlier in an
appeal for funds, Thirkield explained that the Howard
University Medical Department "has reached a crisis in
its affairs." "On the one hand, it is confronted with the
necessity of providing medical education for colored
students which shall comply with modern standards; on
the other hand is the absolute impossibility ofproviding
such education when the income is derived from fees
alone." Taking his cue from Flexner's report, Thirkield
informed Carnegie that Howard "trains men of science,
especially versed in the problems of sanitation and pre-
ventive medicine." The work of its graduates would
improve white health as well as black because many dis-
eases are transmitted from one race to the other.50
Despite these appeals and others over the next few
years, no dollars from the Carnegie fortune found their
way to Howard's medical school.5'
Hubbard of Meharry also appealed to Carnegie, for
$20,000 to build a hospital. Flexner had urged its con-
struction in 1910 to make Meharry a first-rate medical
school. Carnegie agreed and donated $10,000 on the
condition that Hubbard raise the rest. This he did, and in
1913 the G.W Hubbard Hospital was dedicated.52 But
Meharry's further appeals, like Howard's, for larger
sums or for an endowment, elicited similarly negative
responses. Andrew Carnegie finally told Pritchett, who
had urged funding, "Ifwe start helping medical colleges
for colored people, we cannot discontinue." Their needs,
he felt, were too great and their allies who might help in
the funding too few.53
The needs ofblack schools were great-too great for
individual philanthropists or religious outreach boards,
such as the Freedmen's Aid Society (supporting Mehar-
ry) or the American Baptist Home Mission Society
(supporting Leonard) to manage. Yet The Carnegie
Foundation, the philanthropic organization associated
with Flexner's investigation that ultimately encouraged
continuation of Meharry and Howard, refused financial
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assistance to these schools. In 1912, Flexner himself
moved to the other large, education-oriented philan-
thropic organization in the United States, the GEB.
Black medical school officials wrote to both Flexner
and Pritchett, hoping that the personnel change signaled
a policy change as well, but both the GEB and The
Carnegie Foundation turned them down or delayed
action for several years.54
A Second Crisis Period
Between 1912 and 1918, the situation worsened for the
black schools. Leonard could not get the ear of any fund-
ing agency after the GEB gave it a tiny amount toward a
new hospital in 1910.55 In 1914, the school, despite its
high admission standards and reasonably good laboratory
facilities, of necessity dropped its clinical program in
exchange for a B ranking from the CME.56 Earlier that
same year, Meharry lost its A rating and received a repri-
mand from the CME representative who visited the
school. A number of problems had been identified: the
faculty consisted of only three full-time and 24 part-time
instructors for 354 medical students; the school's enforce-
ment of student entrance standards could not be verified
from existing records; medical, dental and pharmacy stu-
dents took classes together; the new hospital, with 58
beds, had only 23 occupants at the time of the visit and
averaged only 30; the outpatient department served only
6-8 patients per day; no medical library, medical museum
or modem teaching tools such as reflectoscopes or stere-
opticons were available for student instruction; laborato-
ries were poorly equipped; no course was offered in phar-
macology; the curriculum was only partially
graded-first- and second-year students took classes
together as did third- and fourth-year students. To that
time, the inspector stated in his report, Meharry had
retained a class-A rating because it was a black school.
After each previous inspection, investigators had told
school authorities of existing problems and how to correct
them. Many ofthe deficiencies could have been corrected
at little expense. Because Howard University upheld prop-
er entrance requirements (it had just begun insisting on
two years of college courses) and offered a strong educa-
tion program, the CME need not keep Meharry "in a clas-
sification where it clearly does not belong." So the CME
voted to reduce Meharry to a B ranking.57 Medical educa-
tion for African Americans seemed to be deteriorating.
The CME, in addition to rating schools, campaigned
to tighten state licensure requirements. More and more
states began insisting on basic college science courses,58
or even two years of college, as entrance standards for
their medical schools or as prerequisites to taking licen-
sure exams. Some states even refused licenses to gradu-
ates ofboth white and black class-B and -C schools.59
The black schools continued to appeal for help from
Pritchett at The Carnegie Foundation and Flexner at the
GEB. Neither man ignored the problem, but both found
their efforts thwarted or delayed by their own or other agen-
cies. They tried to convince their respective boards to fund
African-American medical education between 1912 and
1916, but neither foundation would be pushed too quickly.60
Not until December of 1916 did the two agencies combine
forces and offer Meharry, as a stopgap measure, $15,000 a
year so that it could remain open but still without an endow-
ment.61 As Flexner observed Howard's and Meharry's strug-
gles to maintain their programs, he worried that they (and
all other medical schools in the South) ought not be pushed
into radical changes too quickly lest they be forced to close
unnecessarily. They should not, he believed, be compared to
white northern schools, but rather should be permitted to
make improvements based on a less compressed timetable.
Flexner strongly disapproved of the CME's constant pres-
sure on Meharry to improve. In late 1914, he feared that
Meharry would "be choked" if the CME forced too many
changes too quickly on the black schools. But the CME per-
sisted in spite ofFlexner's protests.62
In fact, the black schools were being choked. They
were caught in a power squeeze between, on the one
hand, two large foundations that put white medical edu-
cation needs above black, and on the other, a powerful
medical organization that refused to recognize the spe-
cial needs of African-American medical schools and
African-American physicians. The crisis peaked in the
fall of 1917. None of the three missionary black medical
schools was healthy, and Leonard was about to collapse.
Hubbard presented the problems ofAfrican-American
medical schools to the annual meeting of the Southern
Medical Association, which passed a resolution urging
the AMA to take action to save the schools.63 Aaron
McDuffie Moore, MD, a Leonard graduate and respect-
ed Durham, NC, physician, headed a committee of the
NMA that drew up and sent an eloquent and desperate
"Appeal for Medical Education for Negroes" to the
AMA, the GEB and The Carnegie Foundation.64 Mehar-
ry and Leonard officials asked the CME for "reinspec-
tions" and A ratings, lest they lose recognition with the
licensure boards of several southern states. The CME
responded that it would happily reevaluate the schools
but that, without endowments, Leonard and Meharry
could not improve their education programs in any
meaningful and permanent way. Nor could the CME
compromise its standards for some schools without
jeopardizing its own credibility. The problem was really
out of its hands. State licensing boards and medical col-
leges themselves were increasing the pressure to raise
standards.65 Colwell, secretary of the CME, did person-
ally appeal to Flexner and Pritchett to give endowments
to the black schools, asserting that the GEB and The
Carnegie Foundation were doing these colleges "a grave
injustice" by withholding funds.66 He had, on February
4, 1918, already made these statements publicly in an
address to the CME conference of 1918, which was later
published.67 Flexner and Pritchett responded hotly and
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frankly, asking Colwell to consider "how far this injus-
tice is due to the action of the Council." They felt the
black schools were making "good progress under the
normal pressure of improvement" and did not need
CME's harsh prodding.68
By May 1918, Moore and others were desperate.
Leonard faced imminent closing, and black doctors
attending recent state association conventions were
"very much depressed" over the situation there and at
Meharry. Using words that illustrate the stature Flexner
had achieved in medical education circles, Moore wrote
to him,
We are making our final appeal to you as the
most potent representative of the medical profes-
sion in America and also as the Financial Agent
whose word is final on such matters. We regard
your Board [GEB] as an equalizing agency,
because tax money in the south was spent on educating
white physicians and none was spent on black medical
education.69 Flexner, however, deflected the arrow of
blame back at the CME and Colwell. Accusations and
denials again flew back and forth. Colwell labeled the
situation a "so-called crisis," claiming that recent
actions by Florida, North Carolina and Virginia to deny
recognition to class-B institutions had "suddenly awak-
ened Meharry and Leonard to the importance of seeking
a class-A rating-a rating which they have been content
to do without for several years."70 Interestingly, in the
midst of these battles over the fate of black medical
schools, fought between organized white medicine and
organized white philanthropy, the principal leaders on
both sides found one point on which they agreed: that
"high-grade white schools such as Columbia and the
University of Pennsylvania" needed funding on a large
scale before the black schools.71
In the end, no agency acted to save Leonard, which
closed before the 1918-1919 school year began.72 The
annual $15,000 joint Carnegie Foundation/GEB appro-
priation kept Meharry alive for another year until the
two foundations could finally agree on a $300,000
grant, contingent on Meharry's raising $200,000 more.73
Howard, the school with the most promise in 1910, stag-
gered along without significant philanthropic funding
until the early 1920s, as Pritchett and Flexner favored
Meharry.74 The first two decades of the 20th century
ended with three black medical schools still open-the
University ofWest Tennessee existing precariously as an
unrecognized proprietary institution, and Meharry and
Howard with small endowments-and none with an
assured future.
Flexner worked closely on the problems of medical
education for blacks from 1908, when he began his
study for The Carnegie Foundation for the Advance-
ment of Teaching and the AMA, through the next
decade. He believed only Howard and Meharry pos-
sessed the potential for success in the medical education
system he envisioned and argued for their survival at the
expense of the other five. Those five did close-three, it
appears, as a direct result of his 1910 report, one
(Leonard) despite his attempts to ease the CME's pres-
sure on it and one (West Tennessee) for other reasons.
His strong efforts to provide funding for Meharry
helped save that school from closing.
Black Medical Education to
Mid-Century
From 1920 to 1950, the two remaining black medical
schools continued their struggle for existence in the
white medical world, one emerging stronger than the
other. A black student entering either school during
these years might still have wondered, as had students in
1900, whether the school would survive until graduation
day. By the 1930s, though, Howard was in a less precari-
ous position than Meharry. Organized medicine and
large philanthropies continued to exert influence over
the schools.
For Meharry in 1921, the first priority was obtaining
an A rating from the CME. Flexner convinced a reluc-
tant CME in 1922 to raise Meharry's ranking after it had
twice in two years refused to do so. But Meharry was
still not, in the opinion of many, an A school. As one
recent historian has characterized Meharry during this
period, "laboratory facilities were grossly inadequate;
instructors were overworked, poorly paid and under-
trained; library resources were virtually nonexistent;
and students were indiscriminately admitted."75 Mehar-
ry's president, John J. Mullowney, Hubbard's successor,
mismanaged the institution and generated much ill will
among faculty and staff and within Nashville's black
community. The GEB, under Flexner's influence,
poured millions of dollars into the school's budget
(about $8 million between 1916 and 1949) and became
involved between 1933 and 1938 in the movement to
remove Mullowney as president and appoint Edward
Turner of Chicago. Turner did much to improve the
school in a short time, saving Meharry's A rating in
1938. Money problems continued to plague the school
throughout the 1940s. Announcements by the GEB and
other philanthropists during that decade that they would
soon cease making contributions to Meharry plunged
the institution into another financial crisis at the dawn
of the Civil Rights era.76
Howard also faced financial problems between 1920
and 1950, but of a different sort. Because the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Interior provided funds for Howard's operat-
ing budget and allowed free teaching use of Freedmen's
Hospital, adjacent to campus, large philanthropic organi-
zations, such as The Carnegie Foundation and the GEB,
saw Howard's maintenance as a government responsibili-
ty. In 1920, Howard desperately needed help, not with
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clinical education (Freedmen's Hospital served that aspect
well) but in the basic sciences. As Flexner characterized
Howard's wants in a 1920 memorandum to the GEB: "The
laboratory branches are starved for support and equip-
ment."77 He urged the GEB to contribute $250,000 toward
a $500,000 endowment and to make funds immediately
available for hiring basic science faculty and for laborato-
ry equipment. This time, the GEB agreed and donated
about $700,000 over the next 21 years. This amount,
joined with increased government appropriations, a gift
from the Julius Rosenwald Foundation, and donations
from black and white citizens across the country, provided
Howard by the 1940s with an improved physical plant and
faculty and a small but solid endowment fund. Leadership
during this period from President Mordecai Johnson, and
from Numa P.G. Adams, the first African-American dean
ofthe medical school, placed Howard in a strong position
to face the new problems ofthe civil rights era.78
By 1950, Howard and Meharry together were gradu-
ating about 100 black physicians annually, and white
medical schools were graduating a total of about 10-20
more. The Great Depression had taken its toll on poten-
tial black physicians who could not afford to attend
medical school. The number ofblack practitioners in the
United States dropped 5% between 1932 and 1942,
while the number of white physicians increased 12%.
The strong need for more black physicians continued,
but the capabilities of the two medical schools that
trained black students remained limited. The many
applicants rejected from Howard and Meharry in the
late 1 940s had few options for attendance at other med-
ical schools.79 Flexner, in the early 1920s, saved the two
schools he thought worth saving. But the demise of the
other black medical schools had created problems
Americans were just beginning to face in the 1950s.
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